Abstract-As an emerging decentralized technology, peerto-peer architecture arises as a new model for distributed computing and transaction, consequently there is a need for a scheme to incorporate payment services in this environment to enable electronic payment via peer-to-peer systems. In this paper, a transferable token is proposed for peer-to-peer payment system, which can float from a peer to another peer. When this kind of token is used, the fraud such as double spending can be found out but the broker need not be involved online in the payment. The optimistic payment protocol for both the basic payment and the cascading payment are presented. The disputes which might occur are analyzed and handling solution is proposed. The arbitrator need not be involved unless disputes have occurs. The optimistic payment scheme is efficient, practical and suitable for peer-to-peer transaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer networks are system where peer nodes communicate and transport information directly with each other. Unlike the conventional client-server model, a peer node of peer-to-peer networks may act as both a client and a server simultaneously to share files or computing powers. It can request, serve, or relay services as needed. A major differentiating factor of peer-to-peer system from traditional models is the lack of central management and control.
In traditional electronic commerce transaction, some parties serve as vendors, who only sell goods, and the others act as buyers, who only purchase goods. Usually vendors receive the electronic token or other payment instrument, and subsequently cash it from the bank, instead of using it for buying goods from other vendors.
However, in peer-to-peer payment environment, peers serve as both vendors and buyers. After a buyer pays some tokens for purchasing goods from a vendor, the vendor peer might buy goods from another peer with the tokes obtained in previous transactions. Usually each peer-to-peer transaction is of small value, but payment occurs frequently. The efficiency is prior to security and anonymity in a peer-to-peer system, and the payment should be light weight, otherwise the cost of the payment will outweigh the value of the payment. As a result, a coin or token need be transferable and used repeatedly in multiple transactions before the broker must be involved in cashing.
An exchange protocol is said to be fair if it allows two or more parties to exchange electronic information in such a way that, at the end of the protocol, no honest party has sent anything valuable unless he has received everything he expected. Those protocols often use a trusted third party (TTP) helping the participants to successfully realize the exchange.
In this paper, we introduce a new peer-to-peer payment protocol in which a new class of transferable token is presented, and it provides a secure and practical scheme in which transactions are guaranteed to play fairly, possible disputes are effectively handled, broke and arbitrator are not online involved.
In the following section, we give an overview of related work in this field. The token mechanism for payment is introduced in section III. An optimistic protocol for basic payment is described in section IV. A protocol for optimistic cascading payment is proposed in section V. Conclusions are drawn in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of research projects have engaged in peer-to-peer computing and most of them have been focused on efficient resource location and load balancing. Very few researches have addressed the need of payments in peer-to-peer environment.
An early peer-to-peer payment scheme is provided in [1] , which relies on a on-line escrow. In this scheme, an escrow server deals with the protocol commitment, transmission of decryption key and payment. The escrow server bearing too much burden will be inefficient and it might become the bottleneck of payment system.
Another peer-to-peer payment system is provided in [2] , where a stamped digital note is introduced as token of the transaction. The digital note is produced by the specific vendor and is stamped by the broker, and it can only be received and cashed by its issuer, so the scheme has still poor scalability.
The peer-to-peer payment scheme in [3] inherits the idea of the stamped digital note, where the buyer does not need special digital notes for each vendor. Instead, he can buy digital goods from several vendors by interacting with an only agent representing these vendors. In this scheme, the tokens can only be used by a few vendors and the on-line third party is a heavy server in fact.
In the payment protocol provided in [4] , the buyer obtains the coin BrokerScrip from the broker, and the coin VendorScrip is produced by the vendor. The buyer and the vendor exchange their coins, and then buyer pays VendorScrip to buy the goods. The scheme is neither practical nor convenient because a buyer must obtain special coins from different vendor before per transaction.
The problem with each of the above peer-to-peer payment schemes is the heavy load on the centralized broker or trusted third party. A broker is required to handle accounts, distribute and cash coins, etc. TTP is involved in each transaction. Brokers or TTP therefore present a scalability and performance bottleneck.
Ppay is a micropayment scheme for peer-to-peer environment [5] , which presents the concept of floating currency to greatly reduce broker involvement. The currency is allowed to float from one node to another without involving a centralized broker. But the related payment protocol is not presented.
A framework for cascading payments is provided in [6] for peer-to-peer transaction, where a system of cascading payments is used to ensure parties are compensated. But the payment protocol has not been presented.
N. Asokan et al. present optimistic fair protocols for electronic commerce exchange by introducing trusted third party handling the disputes [7, 8, 9] . The optimistic protocol is used for light weight payment, and TTP is avoided becoming the bottleneck of transaction.
G. Wang and A. Das [10] analyzed the fairness of some typical complex exchanges, and proposed some requirements for designing electronic commerce protocol, but the concrete exchange protocols are not given.
In following sections, the idea of the floating and transferable currency is adopted and a complete fair non-repudiation payment protocol will be described.
III. TRANSFERABLE TOKEN
An efficient and practical payment protocol should be designed so that most fraud can be avoided, and the token is transferable to greatly reduce broker involvement. In this payment scheme, it is rational that the set of all peers are treated as a peer-to-peer group, whose members are both buyer peer and vendor peer. An arbitrator (i.e. TTP) is necessary to prevent fraud in the group.
A. Preliminary
(1) Bank Setup
In our scheme, Schnorr's blind signature [11] 
B. Token Description （1）Token Withdraw
Let's assume that each peer has broker account, and the broker prepares a key pair for the peer-to-peer group. The broker's and all peers' public keys are published. When a peer wants to obtain tokens, he first sends a digital notes and his account to the broker. The broker adds a broker stamp to form a stamped digital note and send it back to the peer. The peer is the token owner now. (mod p). In Schnorr blind signature protocol, the exponential operations can be performed preliminarily, and only hash operation is on-line required. So Schnorr blind signature protocol is more efficient than RSA scheme.
（2）Token Transfer Let's assume that A 0 is the owner of a token, A 1 ,A 2 , A 3 ,…A n are successively holders of the token. The token is transferred from peer A i to A i+1 as follows:
The broker's stamps can be used to verify the tokens. The item Sig A i (DigitalNote, A i , A i+1 ) is the proof that A i+1 has received the token from A i . The item holderpath is the list of the token's holders, which is of the form
, A i } similarly to the form of onion route [12] , where SK is an encryption by the holder's private key.
（3）Token Cashing When a token holder A i wants to cash the token, he sends his broker account and the token to the broker:
The broker (commonly bank) will verify the validity of the tokens. The valid token will be marked as spent. The broker will transfer the equal amounts of funds to the account of token holder, and record item holderpath of the token. Invalid tokens will be rejected. A
can verify the validity of the signature by an interactive zero-knowledge proof shown below:
① A i+1 randomly choose two numbers i, j∈Z n , and
Here H is a strong collision-free hash function.
If the equation in ⑤ holds, S A (m) is regarded a valid partial signature on message m，or else the partial signature S A (m) will be refused by A i+1 .
C. Security of Token
First, the holder of a token may commit fraud by double spending. For example, the original holder of a token A 0 transfer it to A 1 , A 1 transfer it to A 2 ,…. When a malicious peer A i has received the token, he transfers it to B 1 , then B 1 transfer it to B 2 , ….until B 1 's descendant holder B m cash it; otherwise, A i transfers the same token to C 1 , then C 1 transfer it to C 2 , ….until C 1 's descendant holder C n cash it also. If B m first submit the token to cash it in the broker, he will successfully cash the token, and the token will be marked spent. Then C n submit the token to cash it also, the broker will find the token is double spent. The broker submits two holder lists to the arbitrator. The arbitrator compares two holder list, If the token has been double spent and both holder lists have no intersection, one of two holder lists must have been forged. By unwrapping the holder lists of two token and analyzing the reception proof of each holder that the token was transferred by predecessor holder, the malicious peer would not be able to give the reception proof of the token, so the fraud is found out.
The holder list of a token recorded by the broker may be used for the proof that a peer has made fraud. The malicious peer can't disavow the fact because the holder list has been encrypted by his private key. The fraud peer will be punished severely and the extra payment for the double spending will be compensated. 
IV. OPTIMISTIC PROTOCOL FOR BASIC PAYMENT

A. Preliminaries
A basic peer-to-peer payment system shown as Figure  1 contains three parties: A buyer peer C, A vendor peer M, and an arbitrator A. An arbitrator is a trusted third party (TTP), whose arbitrations are always respected and abided by all peers, brokers and law officers.
In the scheme, the symmetric encryption uses secure encryption algorithm, such as AES. A hash function H should be collision resistant. We assume that there are secure and authenticated channels between any two parties. These could be achieved using public key cryptography such as using SSL.
We assume that the buyer C decides to buy the digital goods goods within peer-to-peer group. C searches the vendor peers with the goods goods by peer-to-peer lookup services system and chooses suitable vendor peers.
B. Protocol Description
The transaction protocol is described as follows: In step 1, the buyer peer C sends his identifier C, the goods order information, bid bid for the goods, and the transaction identifier TID to the vendor peer M. TID is unique serial number used identifying the transaction.
In step 2, M replies with the transaction identifier TID, goods identifier PID, goods description desc, quote price price, and his signature on (TID, PID, desc, price). The item desc is usually the hash value of the digital goods.
Steps 1 and step 2 may be repeated repetitiously as needed until the buyer and vendor can agree on a price.
In step 3, C firstly send his identifier C, the transaction identifier TID, and the specified amounts of token except the broker stamp to the peer M.
In step 4, after M has received C's tokens, he randomly chooses a symmetric key s and encrypts the goods by the key s, and then he sends his identifier M, transaction identifier TID, the ciphertext of goods endorsed by himself, the signature on the received tokens and a timestamp timestamp to C. The combination of M, TID and timestamp is globally unique to prevent replay attack.
In step 5, after having verified M's signatures, C sends the broker stamp of the token and the proof of token transfer to M. The holder list of the tokens is a kind of onion path in section III. The transfer proof of each token is of the form Sig C (DigitalNote, C, M).
In step 6, after having verified the broker stamps, holder list and transfer proof of the tokens, M sends the symmetric key s decrypting goods to C, and then waits C's acknowledgement for a specified period. If M thinks the token or its holder list received from C is invalid, he will notice C to resend the token and its holder list. If received token is still invalid after the tokens have been resent time after time, he will cancel the protocol.
In step 7, the buyer peer affirms whether the encrypted goods can be decrypted successfully with the key s. If the decryption succeeds, he transfers the acknowledgement Sig C (H(s)) to the vendor, or else the buyer sends the vendor the request for resending the encryption key or the goods. If the buyer has still not obtained valid symmetric key s to decrypt the encrypted goods after the transfer of the symmetric key s has repeated some times, he will call dispute solution shown as the next section.
In step 8, when M receives the request of resending request, he should resend the encryption key or the goods. After M has finally received the acknowledgement information, he encapsulates the holder list of received token and records the transaction information.
C. Dispute Solution
In this scheme, we introduce an arbitrator (trusted third party) to solve the disputes arising among the buyer peers and vendor peers.
After the step 5 in the payment protocol, the vendor has received complete payment token and he can verify its validity before he transfer the symmetric key s to the buyer. The buyer pays tokens before he can receive the key s in the protocol, so there is no possibility that the vendor has transferred the goods and its decryption key to the buyer but he has not got the payment.
There are three kinds of possible disputes discussed as follows:
Dispute Ι: C claims that he hasn't received any decryption key s of goods after he has paid for the goods.
Resolve protocol for dispute Ι is as follows:
C→ T: M, TID, PID, desc, [E s (goods)]
In such a case, C sends all the information received from M to T. T verifies M's signature, and ask M for resending the key s. T decrypts the goods and verifies its validity. If the key s is valid, T sends it to C, or else M is judged a fraud peer.
Dispute ΙΙ: C claims that he can not obtain the valid goods from the item E s (goods) and key s.
Resolve protocol for dispute ΙΙ is as follows: In such a case, C sends to T all the information received from M. T verifies M's signature, and asks M for resending the key s. M transfers the key s signed by him and states that he has not received the broker stamp of payment token. T asks C to resend the token. T decrypts the goods and verifies it. If both the key s and the tokens are valid, they will be respectively sent to C and M, or else the fraud peer is judged.
In this scheme, three classes of possible disputes are analyzed and handled appropriately and finally no peer might be swindled. If the buyer has no received goods or the vendor has not received payment token, they can gain their requirement by asking the arbitrator to handle dispute. The transaction fairness can be guaranteed.
When a peer is judged a fraud peer, legal action should be taken and the malicious peer should be punished severely. The necessary punishment will effectively decrease the fraud so that arbitrator need infrequently be involved in dispute handle and efficiency of the peer-to -peer transaction is improved. The arbitrator only participates in the protocol when a dispute occurs. The protocol is efficient and practical.
V. OPTIMISTIC SCHEME FOR CASCADING PAYMENT
A. Preliminaries
In a cascading peer-to-peer model, theoretically unlimited peers can participate in the whole transaction. Among these peers, there should be an end buyer and an goods owner. The other peers are intermediary who buy the goods and then resell it to another peer. A payment system should ensure the accurate distribution of payments to the appropriate peers, where the owner receives a fixed amount of payment value (i.e. royalty) every time his goods is propagated and each intermediary peer receives a middleman's fee (i.e. commission).
A cascading peer-to-peer payment system contains multiple peers in peer-to-peer group G: A end buyer who receives the goods as a user, denoted by C; A supplier peer who produces the goods, denoted by O; multiple middleman peers who buy the goods and then resell it, denoted by A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , …A m-1 , A m ,; An arbitrator T is introduced to arbitrate the disputes and guaranteed the fairness of payment protocol. An arbitrator is a trusted third party (TTP), whose arbitrations are always respected and abided by all peers, brokers and law officers. In the scheme, the symmetric encryption uses secure encryption algorithm, such as 3DES, IDEA or AES. A hash function H should be collision resistant. This function could be realized by using SHA-1 or MD5. We assume that there are secure and authenticated channels between any two parties. These could be achieved using public key cryptography such as using SSL.
We assume that the buyer peer C decides to buy the digital goods goods within peer-to-peer group. C searches the vendor peers with the goods goods by peer-to-peer lookup services system and chooses suitable vendor peers. When a buyer peer requests the purchase of goods by peer-to-peer content lookup mechanism, he is informed of the payment details which include the goods owner's details along with the amount due to the owner (royalty) and the identifier of the intermediary along with the amount due to middleman (commission).
To ensure only the owner can claim royalty, the payment shall be encapsulated for the owner at the payment origin by the use of encryption techniques. Digital goods needs to be tagged with the owner's identifier and the royalty endorsed by the owner.
The scheme for cascading payment is similar with the basic payment situation described in previous section, and preliminaries are the same as in the basic payment.
B. Protocol Description
Detailed transaction protocol is as follows: 
12. for i = m ~ 1:
15. A i ：Repackage the item holderpath of each token with own peer identifier
[message] X includes the content message and X's signature on it. PK X (message) is the ciphertext of content message encrypted by X 's public key.
A 1 , A2, … A m , are the intermediary peers between the vendor M and the goods owner O. They deliver the goods and payment one by one. The peer A 0 represents the goods owner, and the peer A m represents the vendor M.
In step 1, the buyer peer C sends his identifier C, the goods request information, and bid bid for the goods to a multicast subgroup of peer-to-peer group, whose members may provide digital goods services.
In step 2, the member of multicast group reply with peer identifier P i , goods identifier PID, goods description desc and quoted price.
In step 3, the buyer peer C compares the price and services provided by every repliers and chooses a suitable vendor peer, denoted by M; then the peer C sends his identifier C, the transaction identifier TID, the goods identifier PID, the goods order information, and the bid bid for the goods to vendor M. TID is unique serial number used identifying the transaction.
In step 4, M replies C with the vendor identifier M, the transaction identifier TID, the goods identifier PID, the vendor signature on message {TID, PID, desc, price}, as well as the royalty for the goods owner and the commission for every middleman peers, including the peer M.
Here the quote price from M to C consists of multiple parties: The royalty signed by the owner O due to the owner, the commission signed by the vendor M due to M, the commission signed by the middleman peer A i due to the peer A i , i=1…k, k is the number of the middleman peer. Because the item royalty and commission have been signed by the goods owner, the intermediary peer might not counterfeit the value of royalty to gain illegal profits.
In step 5, the buyer sends M with TID and the onion payment endorsed by himself [PK M (PKA m-1 (…(PKA 1 (PK O (DigitalNotes for royalty, C, Service-request), O,
In this step, the payment consists of the tokens except for broker stamps. The payment for royalty can only be decrypted by the goods owner. The payment for middleman commission can only be decrypted by the corresponding middleman. The merchant or other peers can't illegally seize the commission due to other peer.
In step 6, the vendor M randomly selects a session key s to encrypt the goods, and then replies C with TID, encrypted goods endorsed by peer M, his signature on the onion payment, and the timestamp.
In step 7, C sends M with TID, the hash value of the encrypted goods, the onion package of broker stamps for payment, and the respective token transfer proof for the participant middlemen and the goods owner. The onion package of broker stamps will make it possible that the goods owner and all intermediaries can successively unpack the onion package by their private key and obtain the broker stamps on the tokens due to them, but they might seize the other tokens due other peers.
In step 8, M sends the session key s to the buyer C. In step 9, the buyer C has still not obtained valid symmetric key s to decrypt the encrypted goods after the transfer of the key s has repeated some times, he will call dispute resolve protocol.
In step 10, for each i∈ (1, k+1) , A i obtains the items DigitalNotes due to him by shucking off a layer of the onion payment with decryption algorithm, and then hands down the transaction identifier and the onion payment except for the broker stamps to peer A i-1 .
If a peer A i can not obtains the valid items DigitalNotes due to him by shucking off a layer of the onion payment, he will request the predecessor peer A i+1 to resend the onion payment. If he can't still obtain the valid payment, he will abort the transmission of the onion payment, and will resort to the dispute solution.
In step 11, from the owner O, the middleman peer A 1 ,…, A k-1 to the vendor M, A i replies the acknowledgement for successful reception of the token's digital notes to A i+1 . A i 's acknowledgement is encryption of the acknowledgement from peer A i-1 by his private key.
In step 12, for each i∈( m,1), A i obtains the stamp brokers of tokens due to him by shucking off a layer of the onion payment with decryption algorithm, and then sends the transaction identifier and the onion payment including the broker stamps to A i-1 .
If a peer A i can not obtains the valid items BrokerStamp due to him by shucking off a layer of the onion payment, he will request A i+1 to resend the onion payment. If he can't still obtain the valid payment, he will abort the transmission of the onion payment, and will resort to dispute solution.
In step 13, for each i∈(m, 1), A i hands down the tokens transfer proof due to {A 0 , A 1 ,…} to A i-1 , which have produced by the buyer. If some tokens transfers proof are not valid, the buyer C will be requested to resend it.
In step 14, from the owner O, the peer A 0 , A 1 ,…, A m-1 to the vendor M, the peer A i replies the acknowledgement for successful reception of the token's broker stamps to the peer A i+1 . A i 's acknowledgement is encryption the acknowledgement from A i-1 with his private key.
The step 10 and step 14 may not be processed immediately. It's more efficient that the intermediary peer transfer the tokens for his superior peer or royalty in batches to the goods owner after he has sale a batch of the same goods. The goods owner need not be involved on-line.
In step 14, every peer encapsulates the holder list of received token and records the transaction information after the validity of the payments due to them has been verified.
In the common peer-to-peer market, incentive mechanism is emphasized and adopted broadly. The more goods the intermediary peer has sale, the more prize he will gain from the owner of the goods. So when the intermediary peer has received the token encrypted by the owner's public key and he is unable to redeem it, he is willing to transfer them to the owner.
C. Dispute Resolve
In the cascading payment scheme, the three classes of dispute still remain and dispute resolve solutions are the same. Moreover, two classes of additional dispute might emerge, i.e. the case that some peer or the owner failed to verify the item DigitalNotes or BrokerStamp of tokens due to him.
If the goods owner or some peer A i can not obtains the valid items DigitalNotes or BrokerStamp due to him by shucking off a layer of the onion payment, the dispute will be handled as follows:
Dispute IV: The goods owner or some peer A i complain that he can not obtains the valid items DigitalNotes by shucking off a layer of the onion payment.
Resolve protocol for dispute IV is as follows: First, the peer A i appeals the arbitrator Tand sends T the onion payment Payment_Notes i which he has received and endorsed by his private key, as well as the petition for invalid payment. In the step 2, T asks C to resend the digital notes and onion payment due to A i . In the step 4, T verifies the digital notes due to A i from C. If it is valid, he will send the digital notes and onion payment to A i , else C is asked resend these data item, or even is regarded as a malicious peer. In the step 5, C verifies the validity of digital notes and replies the arbitrator with acknowledgement, and then hand down the onion payment to A i-1 .
Dispute V:
The goods owner or some peer A i complain that he can not obtains the valid items BrokerStamps by shucking off a layer of the onion payment.
Resolve protocol for dispute V is as follows: First, A i appeals the arbitrator T and sends T the onion payment, which he has received and endorsed by his private key, as well as the petition for invalid payment. In the step 2, A asks the buyer to resend himself the broker stamps and onion payment due to A i . In the step 4, T verifies the broker stamps due to A i from C. If the broker stamps is valid, he will send the stamps and onion payment to A i , else C is asked resend these data item, or even is regarded as a malicious peer. In the step 5, C verifies the validity of broker stamps and replies T the acknowledgement, and then hand down the onion payment to A i-1 .
By far, the possible disputes on this cascading peer-to-peer payment are discussed and feasible scheme for these disputes are proposed. As trusted third party, the arbitrator can be off line and need only be called when disputes have occurred. The payment protocol is optimistic and efficient.
VI. CONCLUSION Peer-to-peer computing technology has become the focus of research on distributed computing and it will be used for electronic commerce. It is necessary to design a suitable payment scheme for peer-to-peer transaction system. In this paper, a transferable token is proposed for payment instrument, which can float from a peer to another peer. The fraud such as double spending can be found out. The broker or bank need not be involved on-line in the payment. The optimistic payment protocol for both the basic payment and the cascading payment are presented. The disputes which might occur are analyzed and handling solution is proposed. The trusted arbitrator need not be involved on-line unless the dispute has occurred. The optimistic payment scheme is efficient, practical and suitable for peer-to-peer transaction.
